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The Education of the Prof: A Work in Progress
Michael A. Magill*

I. INTRODUCTION
The sights and the sounds are instantly familiar. It has
been more than a decade since I left, but it now seems like I
never left. As I sit in the waiting room of the Legal Services office, I am instantly reminded of my earlier tenure in a different
program, in a different state, and in a different generation. The
furniture is second-hand. Lining the shelves are brochures describing the rights of people in areas of law as diverse as repossessions, security deposits, cancellation of contracts, and housing discrimination. Mfixed to the walls are notices describing
grievance procedures, posters detailing Head Start programs,
heat assistance, and Food Stamp facts, and newspaper articles
showing various accomplishments of the staff. Given the passage of time, certain aspects of the waiting area appear different. For instance, a buzzer was used to announce my entry
suggesting security concerns. Crates of children's toys and
books are present, and, perhaps as a concession to the realities
of today's entertainment world, a VCR is available to watch
children's videos (fortunately, there are no "Barney" tapes) or
workshops on "Renting an Apartment" or "The District Justice
Hearing." The phones ring constantly, a reminder of the everpresent needs of clients. The responses I overhear indicate the
urgent nature of many of the inquiries.
It has been over two decades since I began my legal career
at Legal Services as a public-service oriented and reformminded attorney fresh out of law school. Now, revisiting that
·Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State University; B.A., University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana; J.D., Northeastern University School of Law;
LL.M., Temple University School of Law. The author dedicates this article to the dedicated and caring staff of Legal Services Inc. and expresses his appreciation to Sherry
Miller for the typing of this manuscript. In addition, my gratitude goes out to the student interns of The Dickinson School of Law with whom I served as a colleague during
my sabbatical.
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start in light of subsequent career path as a legislative lobbyist,
a litigator in a private firm, and eventually, a full-time teacher
upon my return to academia, I am on the brink of yet another
new experience. Mter having survived the perils of the tenure
process, it is now time for my first sabbatical.
As the time of my sabbatical approached, I often thought
about how to use this respite. So much so, that I put off the
taking of a sabbatical for one full year while deciding on its
best application. The thought of returning to practice, without
the classroom commitment or the committee responsibilities
began to creep into my mind more and more as I focused on the
idea of what a sabbatical would mean. This would prompt a
chance to "try out" what I had been professing; to learn if my
own self-education over the past few years would make a difference in the real world; to take the opportunity to be of service to those in need; and ultimately, to determine if practice
would help "inform" my teaching (as well as update my war
stories!).
Admittedly, the whole concept of a sabbatical was new to
me. Having left the nest of law school upon my graduation, I
had returned to its challenges, although this time from the
other end of the lectern. Now here I was, on the precipice ofreturning to the world of practice I had reveled in during a "past
life," I questioned my capabilities to revisit it after so many
years. Would I be able to again switch my energies- this time
from academic to practitioner? How much of my practice skills
had I retained? Was it like the proverbial return to riding one's
bicycle or instead an attempt to mount a motorcycle never before ridden? How would I react to the realities of advocating in
arenas where answers are needed today rather than in the forum where ideas are discussed and shades of gray abound? Beyond these important issues, having long escaped the daily tedium of wearing suits to work, were mine still in style and
would they even fit (not to mention the effect they would have
on my cleaning bill)?
These fears unresolved, I meet with the managing attorney
of the office. She appreciates my choice to serve the next four
months as a volunteer staff attorney. At the same time, she
questions my background and inclinations toward working
with the economically disadvantaged. We discuss the needs of
the clients and office priorities. In reality, the clients' needs
could never be fully met by the staff, regardless of their abili-
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ties and motivations because there are too many eligible poor
people with too many legal problems for too few staff members.
Once again, this is a reminder of my prior days at legal services, where inquiries were all too often met with "We're sorry,
our limited resources put your case outside our priorities,"
when, to the client, his case was his utmost priority.
I inform the managing attorney that I am very open to
handling all manner of cases, although she may not have
wanted me to staff matters that would be difficult to transfer
upon the completion of my sabbatical. We discuss unemployment compensation cases (which have a relatively short "life"),
housing concerns (including evictions), consumer cases (including repossessions and bankruptcies), and domestic matters (especially the protection from abuse cases that dominate office
resources, both in terms of staffing and hours). We tour the office and all is a blur; its configuration is peculiar, with pathways leading through one office to reach another, shared space,
and noticeably small quarters. The names of those I meet blend
together - attorneys, paralegals, support staff, and law students working as interns. I admittedly cannot help but add to
my anxiety the thought of working with some of the students.
How will they judge my work product, my conduct, my successes, and my lack of the same? In student circles, word tends
to travel fast. I also wonder why one of the paralegals ended
her welcoming comments by adding that, "I can't believe that
you gave up your sabbatical to come here!"
Before I leave the office that initial day, it is decided that I
will serve on "general intake," handling all substantive areas,
but with a "mini-specialization" in unemployment compensation cases. This will alleviate the managing attorney's caseload
and free up her time to concentrate on necessary administrative concerns. I also decide to spend a few minutes with the
student interns. They are quite curious about my desire to devote my sabbatical to the office, expressing surprise at my decision to leave the perceived "comfort" of the academic world.
They express their own enjoyment of their work, and how they
believe they are learning how to be "real" lawyers while helping
those in need. As they discuss their cases, it quickly dawns on
me that the tables have been turned; though I was once a practitioner, these students have been exposed to the realities of
state law practice more recently than I have. Consequently,
they have a better working relationship with state substantive
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law and rules than I have gained through my years in teaching
a "national" approach to the law. Yet, they are all very energized and seem to like the fact that I will be their "colleague"
doing similar work. The lectern has vanished and I bring only
my own prior experience to the table.
I have always stressed preparation in the classroom, both to
the students and to myself. My own misgivings and desire to
relieve my pre-sabbatical "stress" had led me to audit our
school's course in state procedural law, taught, ironically, by
one of the local trial judges before whom I will appear. My attendance clearly piqued the curiosities of the students, many of
whom joked (quite inaccurately) that I would "bust the curve." I
also studied the new state rules of evidence. Coincidentally,
these were recently enacted by the state supreme court and are
scheduled for implementation during my sabbatical. Since I
have taught Evidence from the view of the Federal Rules, the
previously-fragmented state "rules" rarely entered the picture.
I secured certification that I had continued to be a member in
good standing from the supreme court of the previous state in
which I had practiced, and was temporarily admitted by the
judiciary to practice for two and one-half years. Likewise, the
Continuing Legal Education Board gave word of requirements
to stay licensed during that limited time. I also made it my
business to familiarize myself with Legal Service's various
manuals and procedures so that I would be familiar with them
once my sabbatical began.
I realized from the beginning that I would be limited in my
return to practice. After all, it took me years to profess an "expertise" in my areas of teaching - how much would I really be
able to learn in the four plus months I would commit to fulltime practice? While I was open and wanted to learn about all
areas, I remembered that the reality of practice involves "putting out fires" rather than concentrating on specific issues as is
possible with the time that the academy affords. Admittedly,
1
the law professor as an "attorney" is not new concept. However, the focus is different when one tries to function as both a
full-time law professor and a trial attorney in a more limited
2
capacity. My sabbatical thus provides the opportunity to de1. Jonathan L. Entin, The Law Professor as Advocate, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
512, 522 (1987-88).
2. Henry Gabriel, Juggling Scholarship and Social Commitment: Service to the
Community Through Representing Indigent Criminal Defendants, 20 N.C. CENT. L.J.
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termine if the teacher can once again become the practitioner;
if my lessons have advanced my own education and enhanced
my ability as an educator to teach in the real world.
This article will discuss my experiences at Legal Services
from the perspective of how teaching others in the classroom
affected my own competency in returning to practice. As teachers, we frequently comment about the learning process - how
our writing informs our teaching and how we learn from our
students while they are hopefully learning from us. At times
we may wonder whether we also learn from "ourselves." Will
our return to practice make us more effective practitioners,
now that we have had the benefit of the academic life to study
the "bigger picture?" Will practice be different than it once
was? How do the rules (or lack thereof), the procedures, and
the theories we espouse translate to situations in actual forums? Each part of this article addresses a different aspect of
the cases I handled. Part II discusses the effect of the existing
rules and procedures on the pre-hearing preparations for litigation while Part III focuses on the use of the case theme. Finally, Part IV presents an example of how the advocate may
need to use newly enacted rules to educate both the judiciary
as well as the opponent.
II.

THE INFORMALITY OF RULES: AN END RUN TO DISCOVERY

My Evidence class focuses on the Federal Rules of Evidence
as a teaching mechanism by way of both statutory interpretation and strategies in using the Rules as the proponent/opponent ofvarious proofs. I encourage the students toestablish two records, one for the trier of fact and the other for a
possible appellate tribunal. We also discuss the importance of
3
knowing the local judge's interpretation of the Rules. Early on,
students come to realize how important it is to determine the
elements of a particular claim so they will know what types
and sources of proof must be sought during the discovery process. Yet, I realized early in my sabbatical that we do not often
discuss processes in which evidence is proffered to a forum
223, 227 (1992).
3. I learned early in my sabbatical that one of the local judges habitually overruled a hearsay objection to all previous out-of-court statements by a declarant-witness
if that declarant was in court to testifY. If he was "here" in court, nothing he had earlier
said could be "hearsay"!
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whose procedures are less than formal.
An ever-present example of the informality of proceedings
involves administrative hearings. Due to the nature of my sabbatical, I was a "short-timer;" I wanted to handle as many
hearings and appearances as I could, but court cases inevitably
took longer to develop because of discovery rights and due
process concerns. By contrast, the administrative process, with
which I became intimately familiar through unemployment
compensation cases, moved quickly. There was no pre-hearing
discovery, no pre-trial orders, and hearings were scheduled
within a month of the client's claim for benefits. The Rules of
Evidence were, by statute, loosely applied.
My representation of clients in unemployment compensation hearings led me to quickly conclude that the role of advocate in those hearings could be even more challenging than it is
in courtroom proceedings. In these cases, counsel ardently tries
to show facts that justify a finding of no "willful misconduct" in
a termination or "good cause" if the claimant quit her job.
Given these standards, the cases are very fact-oriented. The
problem faced by claimant's counsel is therefore to determine
what proof the employer will try to introduce. While counsel
has access to documents that the employer submits to the Department of Labor concerning the case, as well as the right to
subpoena witnesses and documents to the hearing itself, there
is no formal process to learn which witnesses will testify or the
substance of their testimony. Therefore, counsel must decide
whether to contact the client's former employer in an attempt
to obtain such information or instead rely upon the element of
"surprise" in appearing with the claimant at the hearing. The
former may not assure cooperation and could result in the employer being even more ardent in preparing for the hearing; the
choice of the latter leaves claimant's counsel pondering just
how best to prepare. How can one cross-examine witnesses that
one has not heard testify until the hearing? How does one use
documents that are first seen at the hearing itself? Do you subpoena witnesses when it is possible that they are still working
for the employer and may show bias against the claimant to
protect their own employment?
I was faced with these issues in the case of nurse "W," who
had been terminated by her nursing home employer for alleged
"wrongful misconduct." The supervisor's affidavit filed with the
Department of Labor indicated that she had fired nurse "W" for
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leaving medication unattended in a hallway and within reach
of the nursing home residents for several hours during a particular shift. This allegedly created a "dangerous" condition because of the risk that these medicines could be taken improperly. The employer further submitted various affidavits from
nurse "W's" co-workers that they had seen medicine sitting
unattended in the hallway at various times during that shift.
Curiously, these affidavits were not signed until days after the
supervisor's own affidavit; nurse "W" was not terminated until
then. The claims examiner had denied unemployment compensation benefits to nurse "W'' based on the affidavits of her coworkers. We then filed an appeal requesting a hearing.
During our initial office conference, nurse "W" vehemently
denied ever having left medications unattended. She described
in detail her daily itinerary and the location of medications
throughout that time. In discussing the affidavits of her former
colleagues, she suggested that her supervisor could be quite
"heavy-handed" and may have exerted "pressure" to sign them
after-the-fact. I queried whether these employees would appear
at the hearing and if they would admit to such suspected coercion. The answers were not self-evident yet could prove critical
to the results of the hearing. Nurse "W'' and I discussed the
pros and cons of contacting these potential witnesses. While
they might talk to me, they were not obligated to do so. They
could alert the employer to nurse "W's" representation at the
hearing. Weighing these risks, we decided on a strategy where
the client became her own "discoverer" - she knew each of the
affiants, she would call them and discuss things "casually." We
scripted questions for her to ask: What had they seen that day?
When had they seen it? What had prompted them to fill out
their affidavits? Were they going to be attending the hearing?
If they had evidence favorable to nurse "W" would they testify
to this at the hearing, either voluntarily or via subpoena?
Nurse "W" proved a worthy investigator. She contacted the
affiants and learned that the supervisor had requested each of
them to sign affidavits, suggesting what to state in them. They
did not think that they would be asked to testify because the
supervisor had recently assured them that the situation was
"under control" and that she only needed their affidavits. However, none of the affiants were willing to testify for nurse "W."
They did not want to risk their own employment by testifying
about the supervisor's improper contacts.
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The day of the hearing arrived. The supervisor appeared,
accompanied by the nursing home manager and counsel. However, none of the affiants came. The supervisor was allowed to
testify to her own recollections concerning the medications, but
I objected to the admission of the affidavits as hearsay. The informality of the process again created a problem. An administrative tribunal is not bound by all the "technical rules of evi4
dence" that are followed in a court oflaw; nonetheless, hearsay
5
evidence cannot by itself support a finding offact. My objection
was not fully sustained, yet this ruling did not prove fatal to
our case. Nurse "W" testified as to her own care with the medications and as to her conversations with each of the affiants.
Although the employer objected on hearsay grounds, I responded that such testimony was offered for the limited purpose of impeachment. I must admit that for a minute I thought
I noticed a "deer in the headlights" expression on the hearing
officer's face; I went on to explain that the affiants' statements
to nurse "W' did not have to be taken for their truth value, but
only for the fact that they were said. This would impeach
whatever value the affidavits might otherwise have. The employer was not limited in its cross-examination of nurse "W."
The hearing officer hesitated and a long moment passed before
he admitted this testimony for impeachment purposes.
In my closing argument, I noted the tainted nature of the
affidavits as well as their suspect timing. I maintained that the
heavy-handed nature of the supervisor's conduct made her own
testimony suspect. The very fact that others, including the supervisor, had supposedly seen the "dangerous" medication left
out for hours and had not locked it away belied that this had
ever happened.
The decision arrived two weeks later. The hearing officer
held that there was no "willful misconduct;" the employer had
not met its burden of proving that the medication had been left
unattended. The decision noted that the supervisor's own testimony was made all the more incredulous by her conduct in
securing the affidavits under very suspicious circumstances. It
was my first hearing in a decade - a chance to use what I had
4. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505. See also Vann v. UCBR, 494 A.2d 1081 (Pa.
Cornrow. 1985).
5. Anderson v. Commonwealth Dept. of Pub. Wei., 468 A.2d 1167, 1169 (Pa.
Cornrow. 1983); Burks v. Cornrow. Dept. Of Pub. Wei. 408 A.2d 912, 914 (Pa. Cornrow.
1979); Walker v. UCBR, 367 A.2d 522 (Pa. Cornrow. 1976).
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professed in class. I was able to use the rules, even in their
most informal state, to the client's advantage. And nurse "W,"
as her own "discoverer," allowed us to use the informality of an
administrative hearing to her ultimate benefit. It was great to
be back!
III. THE THEME: How To "Kiss" AND MAKE GOOD
One of the lessons I try to convey in my Evidence class is
that, in whatever forum - be it negotiation, mediation, boardroom, or courtroom - it behooves the advocate to advance a
"theme." The purpose is to capture the essence of the case in
four or five words to catch the attention of the audience or arbiter. One's proof centers around this theme. I am essentially
suggesting that we strive to boil our cases down to a sort of
mantra, one that will encapsulate the proof that will be or has
been presented. One of my sisters, a non-lawyer and therefore
possibly much better in getting to the point, uses the term
6
"KISS" to emphasize this point- "keep it simple, stupid."
While this lesson appears simple on its face, I have noticed
that it is not always easy to put into practice. Perhaps this is a
result of having stressed legal analysis so much that students
have become convinced that analysis equals verbosity. Indeed,
I am reminded of the difficulty many students have in expressing a theme when I ask them to explain their advocacy position
in six words or less, as if speaking to a layperson (e.g., a juror).
Almost invariably, I must cut off their explanation some
twenty-five to thirty words later.
I was reminded of the importance of themes during my sabbatical in what became affectionately known in the Legal Services office as "The Case of the Bullet in the Monkey's Mouth."
Client "L" first came into our office having been denied unemployment benefits and after being terminated from employment
with the state. She was quite articulate and detailed about her
work history, having kept a journal ofvarious contacts and confrontations that had occurred throughout the period of employment. She informed me that numerous comments had been
made by her employer regarding not only her conduct at work
but also her private life. According to "L," her work had never
been affected by any of these "private" concerns, yet she be-

6. I have yet to take this personally, though perhaps I should.
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lieved that she was less than welcome in the workplace. So why
had she lost her job?
The client had an affection for stuffed animals. One of
them, a stuffed monkey, had been visibly placed on her workstation throughout her nearly three years on the job. In its
mouth, imminently visible, was a bullet. "L" placed it there as a
self-serving reminder to just do her job, to "bite the bullet" despite office chitchat about her "different" ways. It turned out
that another state employee, from a separate office, had used
"L's" desk one day and had seen the missile-mouthed monkey.
She then reported this to "L's" supervisor. When "L" returned
to her desk, she was immediately called into a meeting with
her supervisor and other superiors and told she had been
placed on probation because she had created a "dangerous"
situation in the workplace. She was directed to sign a COCE
(Conditions of Continuing Employment) contract if she wished
to return to her job. Having no alternative, she signed the contract requiring her to attend state-scheduled appointments
with appropriate medical personnel for purposes of evaluation
and recommendations to address the "dangerous situation" and
possible return to the workplace.
During our initial interview, "L" shared a copy of the COCE
contract with me. She informed me that she had indeed attended the sessions the state had scheduled and had been diagnosed as fit to return to the job. "L" subsequently did return
to the job, and then used leave time to see her own physician
for a separate problem. Her supervisor requested that "L" provide her with copies of those additional medical records, claiming "L's" private treatment was covered by the COCE contract.
"L" refused to do so, believing that it was not legally required.
The state then sought this information directly from the medical provider, without success. Despite threats of termination,
"L" maintained her unwillingness to provide this separate
medical documentation. She was subsequently terminated and
sought assistance from Legal Services.
I knew in advance that the employer would be represented
at the hearing. The employer's counsel learned of my representation of "L" and contacted me to seek my consent for presentation of telephonic testimony of certain state witnesses who
would not be able to appear at the hearing. While I recognized
that it might be difficult to cross-examine a witness I had never
met and could never look in the eye, at least I had the benefit of
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knowing beforehand the names of the particular adverse witnesses. I was also aware that although "[i]n-person testimony
is normally preferable," testimony by phone was allowed for
7
"compelling reasons." Moreover, I sensed that I might be able
to use the physical absence of the witnesses to my advantage
when it came to questions of credibility.
I realized the stakes were high when "L" revealed that she
had filed a state grievance procedure, and two separate complaints with the Human Resources Department. This led me to
an additional witness: "L's" union representative. At first she
was hesitant to discuss the case with me without the approval
of the union's counsel, but she later proved to be quite accommodating in her explanations of the conditions under which "L"
had signed the COCE contract. Despite her cooperation, she
requested that I subpoena her to the hearing. I believed this
would be to "L's" advantage; a presumably favorable witness
had been "compelled" to testify, thus mitigating any claims that
might be raised concerning her credibility.
The search for a "theme" necessarily began early in the life
of this case. As I often stress in class, I started with my closing
argument and worked backwards to determine just what proof
I would need to support my position. A component of this closing was to determine how best to encapsulate the event: "They
violated her privacy;" "A stuffed animal, openly displayed;"
"The contract was vague;" and "She honored the contract" all
played out in my head. As the hearing neared, I became convinced that the case called for a "cumulative" theme: one addressing the law, another focused on public policy, and a third
based on the use of demonstrative evidence.
The hearing was lengthy, in contrast to the typical unemployment compensation case. Nearly four hours of testimony
centered on the events leading to the COCE contract (the bullet
in the monkey's mouth), the interpretation of that contract (the
ambiguity of the terms), and the aftermath of the contract
(honored by "L," an invasion of privacy by the state). At the beginning of the hearing, I asked the hearing officer to offer into
evidence pictures of the by now "notorious" bullet-mouthed
monkey, which was all of five inches tall ("L" hesitated in parting with the monkey itself by tendering it as an exhibit). I then
placed the actual monkey, bullet properly inserted, on the
7. See 34 PA. CODE§§ 101.127 et seq.
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counsel table within a few feet of the hearing officer. Testimony
supported our contention that the monkey had been conspicuous for over two years, that "L" had attended her statescheduled doctors' appointments, that those medical providers
had indicated that she could return to the job without further
therapy, and that the state sought medical information from
"L" based on subsequent visits she had scheduled on her own.
Even the telephonic questioning of the state's faceless witnesses proved positive; they stumbled in their efforts to define
the meaning of certain terms of the COCE contract. All of this
played into the cumulative theme presented in my closing argument. The state had failed to prove that "L" had committed
"willful misconduct." More significantly, the "contract was
vague" (the stumblings by the telephonic witnesses were abonus), and she had "honored her commitments" by attending the
state scheduled appointments. The "state had invaded her privacy." Public policy should not condone the state seeking out
medical evidence from its employees who seek their own professional assistance and then "punish" employees for not disclosing such information. In addition, "a stuffed animal, always
conspicuous" did not create a "dangerous condition" (quite demonstrably, the furry creature obediently perched in front of
the hearing officer for the entirety of the hearing- no one aps
peared endangered).
The decision came within the week, and it was wholly favorable for "L." Indeed, the decision read like my theme, noting
the vagueness of the COCE contract, the compliance by "L,"
and the overreaching by the state. Perhaps the hearing officer
remembered my own comments about how, if the state's conduct was upheld, even hearing officers, being state employees,
could be subject to such overreaching. There was no comment
about our little stuffed friend being present at the hearing, but
9
I do believe it had its positive effect. Ultimately, our theme
rang true and provided the basis for this favorable decision.

8. The student intern who worked with me on this case commented that the use
of the stuffed monkey had presented a "Seinfeldian" moment to the otherwise dry litigation process; I suspect that this is another evidentiary concept I will need to consider
before this semester's Evidence class.
9. Apparently, these furry critters have staying power. As a going-away present
at the end of my sabbatical, the Legal Services staff presented me with a stuffed monkey, with, of course, a bullet in its mouth. It is prominently-and conspicuouslydisplayed in my office; I have not, as yet, been subject to any disciplinary threats!
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IV. THE USE OF RULES: EDUCATING THE HEARING OFFICER

As fate would have it, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
adopted state Rules of Evidence shortly before my sabbatical
began. This marked the first time that state court proceedings
would be so governed. These rules did not apply to non-court
tribunals, such as administrative agencies, except as provided
by law or unless the tribunal chose to apply them. 10 Nevertheless, they provided a framework for hearing officers to determine whether proof was more reliable than not. The new rules,
with which I was already familiar due to my service on the
State Bar Committee on Evidence, were to go into effect during
my sabbatical. This presented me with an opportunity to share
my expertise with my Legal Services colleagues and test out
the rules on my own.
The very occasion to do this emerged in the case of client
"H," a laborer who had been terminated after twenty-fours
years with his industrial employer. The separation notice indicated that "H" had been fired for "insubordination." The specific violation was not wearing earplugs as required by ear
company policy. "H" readily admitted to me that he had not
worn earplugs but maintained that he was not acting in defiance - indeed, he had been instructed by his doctors not to
wear inner ear protection due to an ear infection. He remained
willing to wear over-the-ear protection as the job required.
The difficulty arose in finding proof to support "H's" position. The medical documentation that "H" had submitted when
his benefits claim was initially rejected revealed that his doctors had stated four years earlier that he should not wear earplugs because of an ear infection, but that this condition had
since healed. A four-year gap in medical documentation ended
on the date of his dismissal. The post-termination medical reports again indicated some irritation inside the ear. Curiously,
it was "H" himself who had submitted the entirety of this medical documentation, even though the post-diagnostic notes indicated that healing had occurred. "H" insisted that he had
shared at least two separate doctor's notes with his prior supervisor in 1994 concerning his ongoing ear problems. The employer responded that he had only received an earlier note
without any update on his condition. Moreover, "H" had signed

10. Comment of 1997 Ad Hoc Committee on Evidence to Rule 101.
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an attendance form indicating that he had attended a meeting
in which he was instructed in the use of earplugs and he had
agreed to use those plugs.
During our office conferences, one of "H's" difficulties became evident. He was functionally illiterate, having been permanently expelled from school in the ninth grade. Although he
had advanced to that grade, he had always been placed in special education classes and was never taught the basics. As aresult, "H" found himself frequently the object of practical jokes
at work when others would falsely tell him the contents of various posters and memos. Rather than admit his inadequacies
he tried to bide them. When individuals in management circu:
lated forms or petitions to be signed, be just etched his name.
Such was the case with the attendance form concerning the
earplugs. This form was brought to his workstation and he was
told to sign it without the opportunity to have it explained to
him.
My series of conferences with "H" left me wondering
whether he actually knew, at least according to his doctors'
notes, that his ear ailments had healed. He insistently stated
that they had never informed him. He explained that his ear
condition was the result of an injury suffered during childhood,
and that his ear had become inflamed and leaked intermittently since that time. Accordingly, he did not believe that he
had any reason to continue seeing ~is do~tors after _1994, ~s he
understood he would just have to hve with these difficultiesalbeit without having to wear earplugs. I attempted to obtain
verification concerning the "H's" actual knowledge by contacting those doctors; I never was able to get past the nurses, nor
was I able to learn exactly what had been disclosed to "H." All
suggestions that those doctors testify on behalf of "H" were met
with the response that "there would be a $600 fee for any testimony."
The only other recourse was to seek testimony from "H's"
union representative, who had been present at the grievance
hearing that had been held upon his termination. According to
that representative, one of the attendees was "H's" former supervisor. This supervisor admitted at the meeting that "H" had
indeed handed him two doctors' notes explaining his ear condition in 1994, both of which recommended that he not wear inner ear protection until his condition had healed. The supervisor admitted that he had acquiesced to "H" not wearing such
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protection. Unfortunately, the latter of those two notes could
not be found, that prescribing doctor had since retired and destroyed his files, and there was no subsequent documentation
in the personnel file. The words of this former supervisor could
support both "H's" contentions that he had both provided notice to his employer and had been relieved of the requirement
to wear inner ear protection. We therefore intended to rely on
these statements by that supervisor, as the agent of the partyopponent (employer), to provide favorable evidence at the hearing.
As fate might have it, the newly enacted Pennsylvania
Rules of Evidence had gone into effect shortly before the day of
our hearing. The hearing officer, from my prior experiences, deferred to rules of courtroom procedure. I believed this to be to
our benefit; the new Rules contained a hearsay exception that
allowed for admission of "a statement by the party's agent or
servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or
employment, made during the existence of the relationship" offered against a party.u Nonetheless, I was aware that this exception, although accepted in the overwhelming majority of
other states, was new to Pennsylvania law. I anticipated some
difficulties in the application of this new rule of law.
The hearing itself went smoothly, despite what I can only
describe as the "attack dog" mentality of the employer's counsel. He was more than adversarial, alternatively displaying
both sarcasm and belligerence towards many of the witnesses,
even belittling "H's" functional illiteracy, which actually portrayed "H" in a more sympathetic light. The situation became
contentious when the union representative attempted to testify
about the former supervisor's statements that had been made
at the grievance hearing. Immediately upon the objection by
the employer's counsel, the hearing officer, without awaiting or
soliciting a response from me, sustained the objection. When I
asked to be heard on the objection, the hearing officer suggested that it was unnecessary, because this was clearly hearsay. However, I persisted in going on the record with an offer of
proof to explain that the supervisor's comment was the admission of the party-opponent (the employer) by its agent. Immediately, counsel for the employer and the hearing officer, almost in unison, responded by noting that any such exception
11. PA. R. EVID. 803(25){D).
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was inapplicable because "H" was no longer employed by this
employer and, additionally, there was no such exception recognized in the commonwealth. It was then that a true "teaching"
moment occurred in a forum outside the traditional classroom.
As a result of the recent passage and implementation of state
rules of evidence, I was prepared-I offered as exhibits both the
new "agency of the party-opponent" rule, along with the commentary to that rule supporting its usage. I further suggested
that both the hearing officer and the employer's counsel" inadvertently misunderstood" the effect of this rule, which focused
on whether the agent of the party-opponent was acting within
his agency at the time of the statements, not whether the employee was still working for that employer. In our case, not only
was the prior supervisor still employed with the company, but
he had also continued working in that position with no change
in responsibilities for the past several years. The hearing officer was swayed by this explanation and reversed her ruling on
the spot; the employer's counsel was clearly flustered. The union representative was then able to testify that "H's" former
supervisor had admitted at the grievance hearing that "H" had
provided two doctor's notices, putting the employer on notice of
his inner ear problems. The employer did not submit any
counterproof to this evidence.
Ultimately, we received a favorable decision. Among the
reasons listed supporting that ruling were the statements of
admission by the former supervisor. Yes, it also helped that the
record revealed no proof that "H" had been advised of the supposed improvement in his ear condition, that he had in good
faith continued to believe he had problems because of ongoing
symptoms in his ear, and that he was indeed willing to wear
over-the-ear protection (which was not offered to him). However, admissions by one's agent can clearly be powerful evidence in support of the opponent's case, especially because of
that person's "inside knowledge" and the fact that employees
may be risking their own employment in offering such proof.
Knowledge was clearly power-the use of the new rules helped
to both educate and prevail.

V. CONCLUSION
As I return to the classroom, I am grateful for the opportunity during my sabbatical to have used academic materials in a
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different classroom-the real world. I was presented with the
challenge of employing what I had professed and the insights I
had learned within the tower to augment my years of preteaching practice. Yes, my years in academia facilitated my
understanding of concepts, theories, and public policy at a more
profound level than in my prior life as a practitioner. The big
picture was much more in focus; I dared not dwell on the
thoughts of my inadequacies during my earlier tour of practice.
The picture itself became all the more comforting when I discovered how my months of practice further enhanced my academic understanding of evidentiary rules and practices in the
everyday world. I was better off as a practitioner but even more
so as a professor.
I appreciated the opportunity to serve in this true-to-life
laboratory as both an advocate for my Legal Services clients
and was flattered to remain the teacher for my colleagues on
evidentiary and trial tactics. I admit that it was also nice to not
have bluebooks awaiting me at the semester's end. However, I
will continue to remind myself that as long as clients have
problems, lawyers will be there to serve; in doing so, the essence of practice has not really changed over the last decadewe still need to listen, counsel, analyze, and communicate. My
anxieties had been overstated and truly do learn from our experiences. My years in academia had proven to be the best
teacher of all.

